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Abstract 
Economic theory suggests that the use of more expensive low-sulphur fuel within an Emission 
Control Area (ECA) should result in lower vessel speeds.  The objective of this paper is to 
investigate empirically, for the first time, whether the introduction of an ECA affects vessel 
speeds.  We utilize a dataset of observed vessel speeds derived from the Automated Information 
System (AIS) for nearly 7,000 ECA boundary crossings over a three-year period.  Our results 
suggest that introducing stricter sulphur regulations inside the North Sea ECA from 1. January 
2015 did not affect vessel speeds once changes in macroeconomic conditions are accounted for. 
Keywords: AIS, emission control areas, vessel speed, fuel prices, green shipping 
 
1. Introduction 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships (MARPOL), specifically 
Annex VI, sets limits on sulphur oxide (SOx) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from ship 
exhausts.  In 2008 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) agreed on the latest version, 
stipulating that global limits on the sulphur content in marine fuels of 3.5% would be reduced to 
0.50% in 2020 or 2025 subject to an interim review in 2018.  MARPOL further defines four 
Emission Control Areas (ECAs) with even more stringent limits on sulphur content in marine 
fuels: the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and English Channel, the North American coast and the US 
Caribbean coast.  The latter two areas also regulate NOx and particulate matter (PM) emissions.  
In the current paper we focus on the implementation of the North Sea ECA regulations, which 
from 22. November 2007 limited marine fuel sulphur content to 1.5%.  A lower limit of 1% 
came into force 1st July 2010, declining further to 0.1% from January 1, 2015.  From a technical 
point of view, there are three ways to comply with these regional MARPOL regulations.  The 
simplest and most common approach is a modification of a vessel’s fuel tank system to enable 
switching from the standard heavy fuel oil (HFO) consumed outside ECAs to marine gas oil 
 
 
when sailing within an ECA.  Other alternatives include natural gas-powered propulsion (LNG) 
and the installation of exhaust cleaning systems for SOx (scrubbers).  Much recent research has 
been devoted to choosing the optimal compliance strategy (see, for instance, Lindstad et al, 
2015; Yang et al, 2012; Balland et al, 2012, 2013; Brynolf et al, 2014; Jiang et al, 2014, Schinas 
and Stefanakos, 2012).  In these studies, the alternatives are commonly assessed according to a 
number of criteria such as investment and operating costs, reliability and maintenance 
requirements.  It is typically recognised that the optimal solution is subject to uncertain future 
price differences of alternative fuels as well as technological and regulatory uncertainty.  A 
common weakness is the focus on cost minimization and failure to take into account that the 
inclusion of LNG propulsion or scrubbers will also affect a vessel’s revenues. This is typically a 
result of a reduction in cargo-carrying capacity, either directly due to additional piping and larger 
fuel tank volumes, or indirectly by affecting a vessel’s centre of gravity, for instance by placing 
heavy scrubber equipment high in the superstructure or LNG fuel tanks on deck for safety 
reasons.  Moreover, as shown empirically in Adland and Strandenes (2007) for a perfectly 
competitive market, higher voyage costs merely increases the lower bound of the spot freight 
rate, passing increases in fuel prices on to the consumer of sea transport.  From shipowners’ 
point of view, this will favour compliance strategies that affect variable costs only (i.e. choosing 
fuel switching as opposed to additional investment in scrubbers or LNG retrofit).  This important 
aspect is poorly understood in the literature on regulatory compliance. 
A separate strand of the literature considers the impact that such environmental regulations 
should have on the operating patterns of vessels, notably as it pertains to speed choice and 
routing.  The observation that the regulatory requirement to burn higher-priced low-sulphur fuel 
should influence speed stems from the classical research on speed optimization (see, e.g. Ronen, 
1982).  Because fuel consumption per time unit is approximately proportional to the cube of 
speed, it can be shown that the optimal (profit maximizing) speed in a one-period setting is 
approximately a function of the square root of the ratio between the freight rate and fuel price 
(Ronen, 1982).  Accordingly, higher fuel prices, all else equal, should lead to reduced sailing 
speeds.  Psaraftis and Kontovas (2013) provide a useful taxonomy and survey of the literature on 
speed models.  Recent computational studies show, at least for the special case of liner shipping 
(Doudnikoff and Lacoste, 2014; Fagerholt et al, 2015) that a possible consequence of reduced 
sailing speeds within ECAs is that vessels must speed up outside to compensate for lost time, and 
that this will increase overall fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.  Fagerholt et al (2015) also 
show that a likely effect of the regulations is that ship operators will choose to sail longer 
distances to avoid or reduce the sailing distances within the ECAs. Nevertheless, the main 
finding in the literature is that slow-steaming results in substantial reductions in carbon 
 
 
emissions (see, for instance, Corbett et al, 2009; Wang and Meng, 2012; Maloni et al, 2013, Zis 
et al, 2014, Ferrari et al, 2015). 
We note that the literature on MARPOL compliance consists only of theoretical or 
computational studies, even though the North Sea ECA, for instance, has existed for nearly a 
decade.  We seek to fill this gap in the literature by providing the first ever empirical study of 
vessel behaviour in regions affected by the ECA regulations.  Specifically, the objective and 
contributions of this paper is to assess statistically i) whether vessels slow down, on average, 
when entering an ECA and ii) whether the introduction of the stricter ECA regulations on 
January 1st, 2015, affected speed patterns.  We do this by building a unique and comprehensive 
dataset of high-frequency speed observations at the individual voyage level for ECA boundary 
crossings, derived from the international Automatic Identification System (AIS).  The remainder 
of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the AIS data and our variable choices, 
Section 3 shows our empirical results and Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. Data and variables 
2.1. Introduction to AIS 
Automatic Identification Systems are designed to automatically provide information about a ship 
and its location/course to other ships and coastal authorities, primarily with the goal of collision 
avoidance.  Specifically, IMO regulation 19 of SOLAS Chapter V requires that AIS shall:  
 Provide information – including the ship’s identity, type, position, course, speed, draught, 
navigational status and other safety-related information – automatically to appropriately 
equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft;  
 Receive automatically such information from similarly fitted ships; monitor and track 
ships; 
 Exchange data with shore-based facilities.   
The regulation requires AIS to be fitted aboard all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards, 
engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on 
international voyages and all passenger ships irrespective of size. The requirement became 
effective for all ships by 31 December 2004 (IMO, 2015). 
A good database of historical AIS data is a veritable treasure trove of high-frequency information 
on vessel behaviour.  In principle, an accurate and complete dataset enables researchers to 
construct complete itineraries for any vessel or any fleet of vessels, with dynamic speeds and 
 
 
loading conditions, as well as detailed knowledge of the time spent in port, at anchorage or in 
repair yards.  However, its application in academic research and commercial use has been 
hampered by the challenges in managing the extremely large volumes of data as well as varying 
quality and geographical coverage.  As an illustration, the volume of raw data behind our study, 
as kindly provided by the Norwegian Coastal Authority (NCA) and collected since February 2nd 
2005, is nearly 6,000 Gigabytes of data. 
 
2.2. Defining the sample 
The data consists of large files with one line per AIS raw message, which are decoded, joined 
and inserted into a database. Obvious errors, e.g., messages not conforming to the standard or 
vessels seemingly moving in excess of 100 knots, are discarded.  The data collected by NCA has 
a varying degree of spatial coverage as time progresses. From early 2005 the network expanded 
with terrestrial base stations, and in 2010 with the addition of satellite coverage. The terrestrial 
base-stations have coverage along the Norwegian coast and 40 - 60 nautical miles into territorial 
waters. From a geographical point of view we focus on North Sea ECA boundary crossings (both 
inbound and outbound) at its northern borders, specifically latitude 62˚N west of Norway and 
north of Scotland (see Figure 1 for an illustration).  We do not include data for the Southern 
boundary in the English Channel in our main analysis, since vessel speeds in such high-traffic-
density areas will be strongly influenced by navigational constraints instead of economic 
optimization.  However, the basic results for the English Channel ECA boundary are reported in 
Table 3A in the appendix for the sake of completeness.  
We note at this stage that a large portion of the fleet is not relevant to the research question.  This 
includes vessels that are not likely to adhere to economic optimization in the traditional sense 
(e.g. cruise/passenger vessels, tugs or fishing vessels) and, more importantly, vessels that always 
burn low-sulphur marine gas oil (MGO) or marine diesel oil (MDO).  Because these distillate 
fuels have always been in compliance with even the strictest ECA limits on sulphur content 
(0.1% from 2015 onwards), ships that are fitted with engines built for MDO/MGO consumption 
only have not been affected by the regulations.  Consequently, there is no reason for this part of 
the fleet to exhibit a behaviour that is contingent on regulatory changes and so it should be 
excluded from our sample in order to avoid a bias towards “no change”.   
It follows that we want to further narrow down our sample based on the fuel type consumed by 
any given vessel.  While this is a known parameter for many ships, the data is incomplete and so 
we must assess this indirectly based on other known vessel parameters, specifically vessel type 
and vessel size.  Table A1 in the appendix shows a breakdown of fuel type by vessel type for the 
 
 
nearly 90,000 oceangoing vessels the Clarkson Research (2016) fleet database.  With reference 
to this table, we note that vessel types defined as “cargo” (container, dry bulk and others) and 
“tanker” (crude tankers, products tankers and gas carriers) in the AIS system also correspond to 
those vessel types most likely to use HFO, while ships operating locally or on short-sea trades 
(dredgers, tugs, ferries, offshore) generally consume distillate fuels.  Our study therefore 
disregards ECA crossings by vessels other than those defined as a tanker or cargo vessel under 
the AIS protocol.   However, it is possible to refine our AIS-derived panel data sample further by 
also considering the relationship between vessel size and fuel type.  We know from marine 
engineering that smaller vessels employed on shorter trades and spending relatively more time 
manoeuvring tend to be equipped with medium-speed 4-stroke engines that require high-grade 
fuels, while big deep-sea vessels are almost exclusively equipped with low-speed 2-stroke 
engines that burn standard HFO.  The reason for this is the trade-off between the former’s lower 
investment, smaller engine plant and ease of manoeuvring, and the lower running costs and 
greater power of the latter.  Accordingly, we expect a high degree of correlation between vessel 
size and fuel type.  Table A2 in the Appendix illustrates the percentage of all vessels by size 
category (based on overall vessel length) that burn HFO.  The results suggest that we should 
disregard ECA crossings by vessels below 100m length as the majority of vessels in this size 
range use low-sulphur distillate fuels.  We note that, in the case of tankers, 100m vessel length 
equates to a carrying capacity of roughly 5,000 DWT, as illustrated by Figure A1 in the 
Appendix.  From the entire dataset, we therefore select only vessels matching the following 
filters: 
 Vessel length being greater than or equal to 100 m 
 Vessel type defined as either cargo or tanker 
 Timestamp of message between 2013.01.01 and 2015.12.31 
From this filtered dataset, we extract every ECA boundary crossing, keeping all position reports 
within a 48-hour window around each crossing. The cutoff time at 24 hours either side is chosen 
to be long enough to incorporate any acceleration or deceleration effects as a vessel approaches 
the associated fuel switching event.  Our discussions with technical managers in the industry 
confirm that the actual fuel switching event usually takes place within a 6-12 hour window prior 
to entering the ECA1.  Furthermore, some vessels will go into shore, e.g., at the Mongstad oil 
terminal on the west coast of Norway, shortly after crossing the ECA border, so we introduce an 
                                                 
1 From a regulatory point of view, the only requirement is that the remaining high-sulphur fuel in the engine and 
affiliated piping system from the fuel tanks has been flushed out by the time the vessel enters the ECA.  Thus, the 




additional filter requiring all included vessels to maintain a speed above 10 knots at all times in 
this 48-hour window. This filter removes all vessels going into ports close to the ECA borders.  
Extending the observation window much beyond 24 hours, particularly for vessels sailing 
Southbound inside the North Sea, would induce “port proximity” effects for a greater part of the 
sample2, with vessels adjusting speeds for non-economic reasons such as meeting a scheduled 
berthing time, maneuvering near shore, or decelerating towards an anchorage. 
 
Figure 1 – Illustration of ECA boundary crossings in 2015 (vessel length > 100m)  
 
                                                 
2 The voyage from the ECA boundary at 62˚N to Hamburg at the sample average sailing speed takes 44 hours. 
 
 
After the introduction of the speed restriction, the data is discretized into rows with one passing 
per row, containing one speed per whole hour starting from t =-24 to +24, and an indication of 
whether this vessel is entering or exiting the ECA zone (inbound/outbound passage). In hours 
with multiple data position reports, we use average speed and in hours with missing position 
reports we use linear interpolation (but no extrapolation). Each passing is further enriched with 
information on current draught, max draught observed, length, beam, ship type and IMO number.  
Our final dataset consists of 6971 individual crossings of the North Sea ECA border (excluding 
the English channel).   
2.3. Other variables 
The speed profiles of individual crossings make up only one part of our panel data set.  In 
addition we want to be able to control for certain attributes of the vessels, directional and 
seasonal effects, as well as fuel and freight market conditions.  The list below contains our 
chosen variables and our reasoning behind their inclusion.  When it comes to technical vessel 
specifications, we purposely include only variables that are reported in the AIS feeds (i.e. main 
dimensions).  While we could in principle use a vessel’s IMO number to look up other technical 
specifications from the various fleet register databases available, this is a rather cumbersome 
exercise that does not add much value.  We divide our variables into three main groups: 
macroeconomic, vessel-specific and voyage-specific as follows: 
Macroeconomic variables 
 Spot freight rate ($/tonne).  For tanker vessels we proxy the spot freight rate by the daily 
TD7 Baltic index for Aframax tankers operating in the North Sea, converted from 
Worldscale to $/tonne using the applicable annual flat rate.  For cargo vessels we use the 
daily C7 Baltic index for Capesize vessels in trans-Atlantic trade. 
 Bunker prices ($/tonne).  We use weekly prices quoted in Rotterdam for 380cst HFO, 
low-sulphur HFO and MGO. 
Vessel-specific variables 
 Length*Beam*Design_Draught.  Using AIS-reported main dimensions, we use their 
cubic product as a proxy for the vessel’s carrying capacity (DWT).  As per graph A1 in 
the Appendix, this is a very good approximation.  Design_Draught corresponds to the 
Summer DWT loading condition (maximum draught). 
 
 
 Age_proxy.  We use the AIS reported IMO number, specifically its first two digits as a 
proxy for when the vessel is built3.  All else equal we would expect older vessels to sail 
slower due to deteriorating hull conditions over time. 
Voyage-specific variables 
 Ratio of AIS-reported draught to Design_draught gives an indication of the loading 
condition.  A ratio of 1 suggests that the vessel is fully loaded, while a ratio around 0.5 
suggests ballast condition.  All else equal, we expect ships with low draught ratios to sail 
faster (a positive coefficient) due to reduced water resistance. 
 Direction dummies (southbound or northbound).  Because vessels sailing northbound will 
typically have left a port in Continental Europe and sailing towards open sea we expect 
higher speeds, on average, for this sailing direction.  
 Season dummies (winter Q1 & Q4 vs. summer Q2 & Q3).  Due to the harsh winter 
weather in the North Sea we wish to control for consistent seasonal speed differences 
(expectedly lower in the winter). 
Ideally, we would have liked to include the chartering status of every vessel as an explanatory 
(voyage-specific) variable.  This is due to the expected dependence between who is in 
operational control of the vessel, cargo ownership and charter party clauses on the speed choice 
(Adland, 2013).  For instance, the operator of a tanker vessel which is not under contract will 
have strong incentives to minimize the fuel bill, while the vessel will be subject to certain 
constraints on speed (e.g. meeting laycan) once it is fixed.  Unfortunately, the fleet of tankers and 
cargo vessels in our filtered sample is very heterogeneous with regards to market transparency 
and the availability of market data such as fixtures.  Specifically, the tanker segment here 
includes LPG and LNG gas carriers, crude, chemicals and products tankers, while the cargo 
segment encompasses container, general cargo and bulk carriers etc.  Even for the most 
transparent sectors, public spot fixtures represent only a small fraction of the annual voyages 
undertaken by the global fleet.  As an illustration, Clarkson Research (2016) reported 2,234 
Panamax bulker spot fixtures during 2015 for a fleet of 2,453 vessels at year end, or less than one 
spot fixture per vessel per year.  Consequently, as the purpose of our paper is to study the speed 
dynamics of the cross section of the entire fleet passing the borders of the North Sea ECA, it is 
not appropriate to substantially reduce the sample size and possibly introduce unknown biases by 
only selecting segments and voyages for which we can find public chartering information.  
                                                 
3 Between 1973 and 1991 the first two digits of the LR number were an indicator of the year of order, and after 1991 
IMO numbers have been issued sequentially.  For a detailed description of IMO number, please refer to Lloyd’s 
Register Foundation Centre, Infosheet No. 45  
 
 
However, we note that the loading condition of every vessel is captured by our draught ratio 
variable and that this may serve as a (weak) proxy for chartering status, as some vessels in ballast 
will be repositioning without contract. 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Student-t tests 
To assess whether the introduction of stricter sulphur requirements inside the North Sea ECA 
after 1st January 2015 had an impact on vessel speeds we consider first the Student-t test of the 
null hypothesis that the mean speed inside and outside the ECA are equal.  The results are shown 
in Table 1 below.  The null hypothesis of equal average speed inside and outside the ECA is 
rejected. The average vessel sailing speed in the sample is higher inside than outside the ECA 
though the mean difference is very small at around 0.2 knots.   While this may seem implausible, 
we note that we are here effectively comparing the two populations of the 24-hour mean vessel 
speeds inside and outside the ECA and that such “daily” speeds exhibit low standard deviation, 
which translates into a low standard error of the mean estimates given the very large number of 
observations. 
Table 1 – Student-t test of different mean speeds inside/outside ECA 
  t-test results with equal variances: H0: two variables have the same mean (1=2)       







1 Speed_inside 6971 13.293 0.024 2.014 13.246 13.340 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Speed_outside 6971 13.092 0.023 1.945 13.047 13.138       
  by vessel type                   
  vessel type=Cargo                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 4775 13.459 0.032 2.178 13.398 13.521 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Speed_outside ECA 4775 13.233 0.030 2.095 13.174 13.292       
  vessel type=Tanker                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 2196 12.931 0.033 1.541 12.867 12.996 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Speed_outside ECA 2196 12.786 0.033 1.525 12.722 12.850       
  by traffic direction                   
  entering ECA                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 3111 13.131 0.036 2.003 13.060 13.201 0.969 0.062 0.031 
 Speed_outside ECA 3111 13.086 0.035 1.926 13.018 13.154       
  exiting ECA                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 3860 13.424 0.032 2.015 13.360 13.487 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
 Speed_outside ECA 3860 13.097 0.032 1.960 13.036 13.159       
  by vessel length                   
  vessel length 100 ~ 150m                    
1 Speed_inside ECA 3381 13.242 0.031 1.814 13.181 13.303 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Speed_outside ECA 3381 13.051 0.029 1.712 12.994 13.109       
  vessel length 150 ~ 200m                    
1 Speed_inside ECA 1691 13.565 0.054 2.240 13.458 13.672 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Speed_outside ECA 1691 13.306 0.053 2.194 13.201 13.411       
  vessel length 200 ~ 250m                    
1 Speed_inside ECA 1169 12.675 0.043 1.456 12.592 12.759 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Speed_outside ECA 1169 12.473 0.040 1.373 12.394 12.552       
  vessel length 250 + m                    
1 Speed_inside ECA 730 13.887 0.100 2.714 13.690 14.084 0.964 0.073 0.036 
 Speed_outside ECA 730 13.779 0.099 2.683 13.584 13.974       
  by date                   
  post 1 Jan 2015                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 2281 13.287 0.043 2.048 13.203 13.371 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Speed_outside ECA 2281 13.131 0.042 1.994 13.049 13.213       
  2013-2014                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 4690 13.296 0.029 1.998 13.239 13.353 1.00 0.00 0.00 
 Speed_outside ECA 4690 13.074 0.028 1.921 13.019 13.129       
 
We furthermore see that both tankers and cargo vessles sail at an slightly higher average speed 
inside than outside the ECA.  When we split the sample into vessels exiting or entering the ECA 
we find the same pattern - vessels sail at slightly higher speeds inside the restricted ECA area. 
But the result for vessels entering is not significant. We also split the sample in size classes and 
find that the speed inside the ECA is slightly higher on average than outside except for the 
largest vessels, above 250 m, where the result is not significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Looking at the impact of sailing direction, Table 2 shows the student-t test results when we 
separate samples by sailing direction - inside ECA, outside ECA and overall, respectively.  We 
note that the differences in mean speeds are statistically significant. This difference is also 
economically meaningful, with northbound vessels sailing around 0.133 knots faster.  
Interestingly, this result is driven by vessel operations inside the ECA. For observations of 
vessels speed outside the ECA we cannot reject the hypothesis that northbound and southbound 
vessels sail at the same average speed. We attribute the difference in average speed observed for 
vessels sailing in the ECA in part to the fact that northbound vessels are more likely to be sailing 
in ballast, with cargo flows (crude oil, natural gas and iron ore) being predominantly southbound 
 
 
from Northern Norway, North Russia or north of Scotland (e.g. the Sullum Voe oil terminal) to 
continental Europe.  However, we are also back to the possible “port proximity effects” 
discussed earlier, where southbound vessels will be approaching a port in continental Europe or 
the UK, while northbound vessels are leaving a heavily trafficked area and heading into the open 
sea. 
Table 2 – Student-t test of different inbound/outbound mean speeds  
  t-test results with equal variances: H0: two variables have the same mean (1=2)    







1 Speed_northbound 3860 13.269 0.030 1.844 13.211 13.328 0.999 0.003 0.002 
 Speed_southbound 3111 13.136 0.034 1.872 13.071 13.202       
  Inside ECA                   
1 Speed_northbound 3860 13.424 0.032 2.015 13.360 13.487 1.000 0.000 0.000 
 Speed_southbound 3111 13.131 0.036 2.003 13.060 13.201       
  outside ECA                   
1 Speed_northbound 3860 13.097 0.032 1.960 13.036 13.159 0.598 0.804 0.402 
 Speed_southbound 3111 13.086 0.035 1.926 13.018 13.154       
 
3.2 Regression analysis: Speed determinants and the effect of regulatory change 
The results in the previous section suggest that certain non-economic variables such as vessel –
size and sailing direction (as a proxy for loading condition) may be key determinants of speed 
and speed changes.  Hence, while this paper is not about the micro-determinants of vessel speed 
per se – rather, we care about the impact of regulatory changes - it is nevertheless useful to 
establish whether vessels speeds appear to be influenced by fuel prices and freight rates in a 
manner consistent with maritime economic theory. 
To establish the determinants of the average speed Vi observed for ECA crossing i in our panel 
data set, we test various specifications of a multiple linear regression model using combinations 
of variables from Section 2.  In particular, if we include all macroeconomic, vessel-specific and 
voyage specific variables, the most comprehensive model is: 
𝑉 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 𝐹 + 𝛼 𝐵 + 𝛼 𝐿𝐵𝐷 + 𝛼 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛼 𝑈 + 𝛼 𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼 𝑄𝐷 + 𝛼 𝑉𝐷 + 𝜀  (1) 
Where Fi is the spot freight rate, Bi is the bunker price, LBDi is our DWT proxy, Agei is our age 
proxy, Ui is our draft ratio measure of loading condition, DDi is a dummy for the northbound 
direction, QDi is a winter season dummy and VD is a dummy denoting observations post the 
 
 
introduction of the stricter sulphur regulation from 1. January 2015.  Finally, εi is a random 
perturbation such that E(εi) = 0 and V(εi) = σ2. 
Following the recent literature on microeconomic analysis of vessel speeds and freight rates (see 
e.g. Adland et al, 2016 and Assman, 2015) we apply standard panel estimation methods, though 
note that other “inexact” methods such as neural networks may be suitable for analysing such 
high volumes of data.  Specifically, we estimate Equation 1 on log-log format and use random 
effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE) models rather than pooled ordinary least squares estimation, as 
the latter does not account for the individual heterogeneity in ships that is constant over time.  
Such an omission would lead to biased and inconsistent coefficients (Verbeek, 2012).  A random 
effects model takes into account variation both within and across observational units over time. 
However, it imposes a strict assumption that the individual unobserved heterogeneity is not 
correlated with the error term. The fixed effects model is less efficient than the random effects 
model, as it eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity by demeaning the variables. While the 
above assumption is redundant, this improvement comes at the expense of the FE model not 
being able to identify the effect of the variables that are constant over time.  The choice between 
the random effects and fixed effects models is dictated by the variability in the data over time 
and the results of the Hausman (1978) test.  The Hausman test is built around the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients estimated by the efficient RE estimator and the consistent FE estimator are 
identical.  If the null hypothesis holds, then the RE estimator is preferable (Green, 2008).  
 
Table 3 – Regression estimates for average vessel speed inside and outside the ECA  
Dependent variable: logrithm of average 
speed   
  (1) (2) 
log_Freight rate § -0.002   
  -(0.350)   
  [0.73]   
log_Bunker price # 0.027 0.029 
  (2.970) (3.350) 
  [0.00] [0.00] 
log_(L*B*D) -0.040   
  -(1.380)   
  [0.17]   
log_age proxy -0.017   
  -(0.230)   
 
 
  [0.82]   
log_draught_ratio -0.012   
  -(1.280)   
  [0.20]   
Dummy_entering ECA -0.021 -0.021 
vs. Exiting ECA -(9.050) -(8.980) 
  [0.00] [0.00] 
Dummy_post 1 Jan 2015 0.014 0.015 
vs. 2013-2014 (1.960) (2.200) 
  [0.05] [0.03] 
Dummy_Winter -0.018 -0.019 
vs. (March-Nov) -(3.150) -(3.270) 
  [0.00] [0.00] 
Constant 2.887 2.402 
  (7.310) (44.080) 
  [0.00] [0.00] 
      
R-sq: within 0.0259 0.0255 
         : between 0.0024 0.0002 
         : overall 0.0000 0.0018 
      
      
Fix effect yes yes 
Hausman test chi2 0.000 0.000 
note: Figures in [ ] are the p- values of H0: zero coeffecients; figures in ( ) are t-stats 
§ tanker freight rate is Baltic TD7 to $/tonne; cargo freight rate is C7. 
# bunker rate is taken as 380cst Rotterdam $/tonne   
 
Table 3 shows the regression results for the log-log format of Equation 1 using the FE estimator.  
Specification 1 shows the results for the full model and in specification 2 we have dropped all 
the insignificant variables from the general specifications and re-estimated the parsimonious 
model.  We can see that the freight rate does not affect the speed decision, whereas the bunker 
price has a minute positive effect on speed contrary to what classical maritime economic theory 
suggests.  Instead, speed is mainly determined primarily by weather conditions (winter speeds 
are lower), the sailing direction (exiting ships sail faster) and the change in fuel sulphur content 
introduced 1st January 2015. (Vessels on average sail faster after the tighter restrictions came into 
force). The signs of the coefficients for weather conditions and sailing direction are as expected 
as per our discussion in Section 2.3.  This is not the case for the sign of the change in regulation, 
however. The change in speed might follow from the steep reduction in fuel costs from 2014 
 
 
(See Figure 2), but this explanation is contradicted by the slight positive effect on speed of 
bunker price indicated by the estimated positive coefficient for bunker price. Our findings 
support the results elsewhere in the empirical speed literature based on AIS data (see, e.g. 
Adland, 2013; Assman et al, 2015; Adland and Jia, 2016a,b) where the classical speed 
optimization theory is largely rejected.  
Figure 2 - Bunker price ($/tonne) developments 
 
Next, we modify Equation 1 slightly such that the dependent variable now is the change in 
average vessel speed for crossing i, ΔVi = Voutside ECA – Vinside ECA. We also introduce a dummy 
for tankers to assess whether the change in average speed differ for vessel type.  The results of 
the log-log regression estimates are shown in Table 4 below.  Once again we start with the most 
general specification (1) and then drop the insignificant variables to arrive at the most 
parsimonious specification (2).  We note that the Hausman test suggests the use of the RE 
estimator.   
The results are less straightforward to interpret once we consider speed differentials.  Basically, a 
positive coefficient in Table 4 suggests that vessels slow down more when crossing into the ECA 
when the respective variable is increasing.  Both coefficients for the freight rate and the bunker 
price have the correct sign, but neither estimates are significant. We note that the fuel price 
variable here refers to the price of ordinary high-sulphur HFO and not the price differential with 
low-sulphur or distillate fuel oil.  Neither vessel size, the age of the vessel nor the draught ratio 
have a significant influence, but the direction dummy shows that the speed difference (relatively 
slower speed inside ECA) is greater for vessels entering than for vessels exiting, and tankers 
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Importantly, the introduction of a stricter sulphur regulation inside the ECA from 2015 did not 
cause a significant change in vessel behavior. Principally, after the regulatory change, vessels 
crossing into the ECA did not adjust the average speed significantly. The bunker price does not 
have significant effect so we cannot contribute this to the reduction in bunker costs onwards 
from 2014.  
Table 4 – Regression estimates for ECA boundary speed changes 
Dependent variable: log Speed difference = log(speed_outside/speed_ 
inside) 
  (1) (2) 
Dummy_post 1 Jan. 2015 0.011   
  (1.620)   
  [0.11]   
log_Freight rate § -0.007   
  -(1.540)   
  [0.12]   
log_Bunker price # 0.014   
  (1.580)   
  [0.12]   
log_(L*B*D) 4.87E-04   
  (0.330)   
  [0.75]   
log_age proxy 0.007   
  (0.780)   
  [0.44]   
log_draught_ratio -0.006   
  -(0.810)   
  [0.42]   
Direction_Dummy 0.021 0.022 
(Entering=1) (8.540) (8.800) 
  [0.00] [0.00] 
Season_Dummy -0.005   
(winter=1) -(0.800)   
  [0.42]   
VesselType_Dummy -0.005 -0.006 
(cargo=1) -(1.780) -(2.220) 
  [0.08] [0.03] 
Constant -0.121 -0.020 
  -(1.800) -(8.390) 
 
 
  [0.07] [0.00] 
R-sq: within 0.0136 0.0121 
         : between 0.0150 0.0131 
         : overall 0.0128 0.0116 
Fix effect no no 
Hausman test chi2 0.102 0.401 
Note: Numbers in [ ] are p- values of H0: zero coeffecients; Numbers in ( ) are t-stats 
§ tanker freight rate is Baltic TD7 to $/tonne; cargo freight rate is C7.   
# bunker rate is taken as 380cst Rotterdam $/tonne     
 
As a final check, we attempt to match the vessel names associated with the individual ECA 
boundary crossings in 2014 and 2015 with vessels that are reported as being on timecharter on 
the same date.  The reason for creating such a sub-sample is the expectation that when charterers 
are in operational control of the vessel and pays the fuel bill directly, we may observe a greater 
sensitivity to the higher cost of burning low-sulphur fuel within the ECA.  As expected due to the 
incomplete nature of public fixture data, the number of matches ends up very low, with only 23 
large tankers and bulkers identified behind 36 crossings in 2014 and 2015.  The t-statistics shown 
in Table 5 illustrates how chartering status does not appear to make a difference, as we are 
unable to reject the hypothesis of equal mean speed inside and outside of the ECA irrespective of 
how we slice the population (by vessel type, sailing direction, vessel size or crossing date).  Once 
again, the prevailing tendency is for higher sailing speeds within the ECA. 
Table 5 - Student-t test of different mean speeds inside/outside ECA for vessels on 
timecharter 
  t-test results with equal variances: H0: two variables have the same mean (1=2)       













1 Speed_inside 36 12.663 0.220 1.320 12.216 13.109 0.671 0.658 0.329 
 Speed_outside 36 12.604 0.163 0.976 12.274 12.935       
  By vessel type                   
  vessel type=Cargo                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 30 12.824 0.246 1.350 12.320 13.328 0.951 0.098 0.049 
 Speed_outside ECA 30 12.619 0.182 0.996 12.247 12.990       
  vessel type=Tanker                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 6 11.859 0.340 0.834 10.984 12.734 0.087 0.174 0.913 
 Speed_outside ECA 6 12.533 0.391 0.958 11.528 13.538       
  by traffic direction                   
  entering ECA                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 12 11.962 0.390 1.350 11.104 12.819 0.093 0.186 0.907 
 
 
 Speed_outside ECA 12 12.295 0.268 0.929 11.705 12.886       
  exiting ECA                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 24 13.014 0.241 1.180 12.515 13.512 0.954 0.093 0.046 
 Speed_outside ECA 24 12.759 0.200 0.981 12.344 13.173       
  by vessel length                   
  vessel length 200 ~ 250m                    
1 Speed_inside ECA 27 12.881 0.266 1.381 12.335 13.427 0.960 0.080 0.040 
 Speed_outside ECA 27 12.659 0.201 1.043 12.246 13.071       
  vessel length 250 + m                    
1 Speed_inside ECA 9 12.009 0.294 0.883 11.331 12.688 0.122 0.244 0.878 
 Speed_outside ECA 9 12.441 0.257 0.772 11.848 13.034       
  by date                   
  post 1 Jan 2015                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 17 12.885 0.330 1.359 12.186 13.584 0.871 0.258 0.129 
 Speed_outside ECA 17 12.659 0.240 0.988 12.151 13.167       
  prior to 2015                   
1 Speed_inside ECA 19 12.464 0.295 1.287 11.844 13.084 0.307 0.614 0.693 
 Speed_outside ECA 19 12.555 0.227 0.990 12.078 13.032       
 
 
4. Discussion and future research    
Overall, the results in our paper do not support the assertion that the introduction of stricter 
Sulphur regulation inside the Emission Control Areas affects vessel speeds in any economically 
significant manner.  On the contrary, we show that vessel speeds are not generally determined by 
fuel prices or freight rates but rather by voyage-specific variables such as whether a vessel is 
heading towards or away from heavily trafficked areas or ports of call, whether it is a tanker or 
cargo vessel, and seasonal weather factors.  For marine navigators this is presumably not a major 
surprise, but it is presumably disheartening for those seeking economic rationality and trying to 
apply complex and highly theoretical optimization models to the maritime supply chain. 
However, one should be careful to dismiss such findings as signs of inefficiency or bounded 
rationality.  There are several good reasons, many of them poorly understood in the academic 
literature, why speed optimization on the basis of changing fuel prices and freight market 
conditions are not likely to take place in practice.  Firstly, there will always be external factors, 
such as safe sailing during poor weather or charter party clauses (e.g. cancelling dates) that take 
priority in practice.  Secondly, fuel consumption as a function of vessel speed in the real seaway 
is an extremely uncertain function, with actual consumption easily surpassing nominal “flat 
 
 
water” consumption by 50% due to fouling, currents and weather conditions.  With such high 
degrees of uncertainty, small theoretical gains in earnings from changing speed will soon be 
swamped by measurement errors.  Thirdly, it is often forgotten that the level of the fuel price is 
not interesting per se – as long as there is a functioning freight market, freight rates will merely 
adapt such that owners of most ships will cover their voyage costs in full.  This means that 
additional costs within ECAs, even with distillate fuel prices being substantially higher, should 
not affect optimal speeds materially.  Hence, one should not be surprised that the stricter sulphur 
regulation inside the North Sea ECA from 2015, requiring vessels to switch to burning higher-
priced marine gas oil, does not seem to affect vessels operations.  Indeed, this should perhaps be 
the a priori hypothesis in the literature. 
From a policy angle, our empirical results suggest that ECA regulations imposing the use of 
higher-cost marine fuels have not contributed to the expected change in vessel behaviour.  
Depending on the nature of commercial contracts and pricing power in the various shipping 
segments, the additional costs of low-sulphur fuels are borne by both consumers and vessel 
operators.  This may lead to increased non-compliance from shipping companies.  This would 
not only weaken the positive effect on emissions, it would also be a major competitive 
disadvantage for the companies that comply with the regulation.  Consequently, strong 
enforcement of ECA regulations by relevant nations and authorities becomes crucial.  In North 
America, there exists a set of inspection, investigation and enforcement procedures set by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US Coast Gard (USCG) with corresponding 
penalty policies.  The US enforcement has led the way by focusing on checking relevant 
documentation, such as the bunker delivery note and the ship's log of fuel changeover timing and 
procedures, and taking fuel samples from ships to test for compliance (EPA, 2016).  In Europe, 
the enforcement of emission regulations in ECAs is not as strong.  The European Union adopted 
a strategic regulation covering Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) which focus on 
CO2 and fuel efficiency. However, since the EU MRV is a regulation and not a directive, which 
means it does not need to be transposed into national law, it has already attracted criticism 
(Gemmill, 2015).  Practical and robust enforcement is therefore required. 
Future research should extend our empirical analysis to the North America ECA where stricter 
enforcement is in place.  In addition, the sailing distance inside ECA in proportion to a vessel’s 
total voyage distance is an important determinant in speed adjustment or optimisation.  
Therefore, speed changes should be considered in relation to the duration of the entire voyage 
(short-sea vs deep-sea shipping).  Additionally, future research should investigate possible 
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Table A1 – Fuel type by vessel type 
MDO/MGO HFO/IFO Unknown Total
Crude tankers 0 1837 1 1838
Product tankers 718 3260 3643 7621
Chemical tankers 175 2202 1065 3442
Specialised tankers 89 183 383 655
Bulkers (>10K dwt) 6 10172 195 10373
Containerships 25 4898 190 5113
MPP 591 2188 445 3224
Ro-Ro 164 651 441 1256
General Cargo 2433 1838 11405 15676
LPG 62 877 343 1282
PCC 6 740 24 770
Reefers 197 570 642 1409
Offshore 5886 506 4297 10689
Dredgers 355 141 1415 1911
Tugs 6409 337 10048 16794
Cruise 38 188 135 361
Ferries 2595 466 3090 6151
Total 19749 31054 37762 88565  
Source:  Clarkson Research (2016) and author calculations 
 
Table A2 – Fuel type by vessel length 
Vessel length 
(LOA) HFO/IFO MDO/MGO Unknown 
HFO% (of 
known) 
< 40 1.3% 42.7% 56.0% 3.0% 
40-60m 2.1% 32.3% 65.7% 6.0% 
60-80m 7.4% 25.2% 67.4% 22.6% 
80-100m 24.5% 25.8% 49.6% 48.7% 
100-120m 54.4% 14.5% 31.1% 79.0% 
120-140m 69.1% 11.6% 19.3% 85.6% 
140-160m 86.4% 2.9% 10.7% 96.7% 
above 160m 95.5% 0.7% 3.8% 99.3% 
 




Figure A1 – Relationship between DWT and vessel length (small tankers) 
 
Source:  Clarkson Research (2016) and author calculations 
 
Table A3 Student t-test of different mean speeds inside and outside ECA for vessels in the 
English Channel. 
  t-test results with equal variances: H0: two variables have the same mean (1=2)         






1<)   
1 Speed_inside 8124 14.940 0.032 2.847 14.878 15.002 1.00 0.00 0.00   
 Speed_outside 8124 14.746 0.031 2.760 14.686 14.806         
  by vessel type                     
  vessel type=Cargo                     
1 Speed_inside ECA 6159 15.435 0.038 2.949 15.361 15.508 1.00 0.00 0.00   
 Speed_outside ECA 6159 15.302 0.036 2.835 15.231 15.373         
  vessel type=Tanker                     
1 Speed_inside ECA 1965 13.390 0.040 1.759 13.312 13.468         
 Speed_outside ECA 1965 13.003 0.034 1.514 12.937 13.070 1.00 0.00 0.00   
  by traffic direction                     
  entering ECA                     
1 Speed_inside ECA 3074 14.954 0.051 2.845 14.853 15.054 0.999 0.002 0.001   
 Speed_outside ECA 3074 14.849 0.052 2.882 14.748 14.951         















1 Speed_inside ECA 5050 14.932 0.040 2.849 14.853 15.011 1.00 0.00 0.00   
 Speed_outside ECA 5050 14.683 0.038 2.681 14.609 14.757         
  by vessel length                     
  vessel length 100 ~ 150m                      
1 Speed_inside ECA 1430 14.045 0.061 2.324 13.925 14.166 1.00 0.00 0.00   
 Speed_outside ECA 1430 13.696 0.059 2.224 13.581 13.812         
  vessel length 150 ~ 200m                      
1 Speed_inside ECA 3234 14.685 0.047 2.648 14.593 14.776 1.00 0.00 0.00   
 Speed_outside ECA 3234 14.432 0.044 2.480 14.347 14.518         
  vessel length 200 ~ 250m                      
1 Speed_inside ECA 1178 14.352 0.077 2.649 14.201 14.504 1.00 0.00 0.00   
 Speed_outside ECA 1178 14.024 0.075 2.565 13.878 14.171         
  vessel length 250 + m                      
1 Speed_inside ECA 2282 16.167 0.065 3.107 16.039 16.294 0.100 0.200 0.900   
 Speed_outside ECA 2282 16.221 0.062 2.939 16.100 16.341         
  by date                     
  post 1 Jan 2015                     
1 Speed_inside ECA 3203 14.796 0.049 2.763 14.700 14.892 0.922 0.155 0.078   
 Speed_outside ECA 3203 14.747 0.048 2.741 14.652 14.842         
  2013-2014                     
1 Speed_inside ECA 4921 15.034 0.041 2.897 14.953 15.115 1.00 0.00 0.00   
 Speed_outside ECA 4921 14.745 0.040 2.772 14.667 14.822         
 
 
 
